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ABSTRACT
The article highlights the powerful influence of contractor selection in im-
proving road project performance in Uganda. It provides empirical evidence 
of the performance of road projects as a less studied phenomenon because 
in Uganda, most public works are delivered with longer delays, contracts are 
more often awarded to larger suppliers and a higher share of the payment 
is postponed after delivery. Use of poor-quality materials, poor scheduling, 
delayed procurement, and poor contractor selection causes cost and time 
overruns on roads. The study adopts a cross sectional design in terms of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to collect data. A multivariate analysis 
and surveys were taken from 190 respondents. It was found that contractor 
monitoring has a significant positive effect on the completion of roads while 
contractor selection has a direct and indirect positive effect on performance 
of roads through the partial mediation of contractor selection. This suggests 
that contractor selection has an effect on the improvement of the level of road 
projects performance in Uganda. There is a need to improve the scrutiny of 
the contractor selection process in road agencies in Uganda. This will require 
a good review of the government policy on contractor selection aimed at 
making it more robust and efficient.
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INTRODUCTION
Although road agencies need to provide road infrastructure that is beneficial for road 
users, little is known about how the activities of the agencies influence the value 
creation of road infrastructure (Muzaale, Byaruhanga and Auriacombe 2018). From 
a service-dominant logic perspective, the influence of contractor selection and the 
monitoring on road infrastructure performance still remains complex given the in-
creasing cases of irregularities in the award of contracts to companies that did not 
qualify, resulting in shoddy work, cost and time overruns in Uganda (Muzaale and 
Auriacombe 2018). In Africa, although use of roads dominates the transport sector, 
carrying 80 to 90% of the passenger and freight traffic in most countries; the condi-
tion of these roads requires regular maintenance by international standards (World 
Bank 2011). In order to respond to the road infrastructure challenges, the African 
countries instituted a wide range of policy reforms (World Bank 2011). Most coun-
tries embarked on the creation of independent sources of funding for road mainte-
nance, based on road-user charges. However, as asserted by Banaitiene (2006), the 
reforms have not fully improved the performance of roads in Africa. According to the 
World Bank (2011), on average, about 43% of the main road networks are in a good 
condition, a further 31% are in a reasonable condition, and the remaining 27% are 
in a poor condition (Okello 2016).
According to the World Bank (2011), Africa has the lowest density of roads as 
compared to any other region of the world. Only 204km per 1 000km in Africa 
are paved, while in the developed world on average 944km per 1 000 km are 
paved (Bagaka and Kobia 2010). The spatial density of sub-Saharan Africa’s roads 
is less than 30% of that of South Asia, where half of the roads are paved, and only 
6% of that of North America, where two-thirds are paved (Barasa 2014).
In response to the low density of roads, the East African leaders have targeted 
road infrastructure as a priority for stimulating economic growth in the region. 
According to Ng’wanalika (2015), in the East African region, Kenya aims to develop 
a 1 700km northern corridor linking Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo to 
its port at Mombasa. On the other hand, Tanzania and Kenya also plan to invest 
in new port projects, at Bagamoyo and Lamu respectively (Byaruhanga, Muzaale 
and Auriacombe 2018).  The East African Community (EAC) countries, in their 
2015–2025 strategy, indicated there is need to invest between US$68 billion to 
US$100 billion to build roads, ports, railways, transmission lines and oil and gas 
infrastructure (Byaruhanga, Muzaale and Auriacombe 2018). The traditional roads 
authority regards the provision of road infrastructure and maintenance as a social 
responsibility. In this scenario there is in most cases little use of the asset value of 
the road infrastructure in the measurement of service delivery, and limited use of the 
business value attached (Horak and Van Wijk 2018). A total paradigm shift is needed 
when such services are contracted out such as when dealing with a roads agency.
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Infrastructure is critical to economic growth and competitiveness in Uganda; 
however, the current inadequate infrastructure is impeding the expected growth. 
Evidence from surveys suggests that infrastructure constraints were responsible 
for as much as 58% of the productivity handicap faced by Ugandan firms as 
indicated in the World Bank AICD Report (2012). Despite the said government 
efforts, there is slow implementation of road projects coupled with an inability to 
implement road projects within the contracted time and cost as key performance 
gaps (OAG 2016). The government has acknowledged the slow progress, which 
is attributed to challenges in the contract award process and the quality of the 
selected road contractors. This assertion was further confirmed by the Ugandan 
minister responsible for works as cited by a local newspaper (The Daily Monitor 
2015) where it was asserted that 80% of the road contractors are incompetent 
and they do shoddy work. To date in Uganda, performance of road infrastructure 
projects in terms of durability, timeliness and cost management is still difficult 
(Mulumba 2016). Although some studies and efforts have been made towards 
understanding project performance (Oluka and Basheka 2014), the underlying 
factors affecting road infrastructure performance such as timeliness, cost overruns 
and durability of roads in Uganda remain hazy. In spite of the call by the govern-
ment of Uganda to handle government projects in a business-like manner, the 
procurement system continues to be clogged with numerous complaints, caus-
ing delays in implementation and where infrastructure contracts are signed, poor 
quality of works and cost overruns are evident. Little has been done to establish 
the causes of numerous complaints and continuous delays, shoddy works and 
escalation of costs in the implementation of road infrastructure projects to design 
appropriate mitigating strategies. However, contractor selection and monitoring is 
a glaring concern under contract management in the road construction industry 
creating a knowledge gap that prompted this study. This article aims:
 Q To establish the relationship between contractor selection and performance of 
road infrastructure projects in Uganda.
 Q To establish the relationship between contractor monitoring and performance 
of road infrastructure projects in Uganda.
 Q To examine the mediating effect of contractor selection on the relationship be-
tween contractor monitoring and performance of road infrastructure projects 
in Uganda.
CONCEPTUALISATION AND CONTEXTUALISATION
On contractor selection, Lingard, Hughes and Chinyio (1998) indicate that deci-
sions are usually made following pre-selection activities of competition or negotia-
tion. Lingard, Hughes and Chinyio (1998) further present that under a competitive 
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contractor selection process, the client puts the works to tender and interested 
contractors respond by submitting bids. Bidding is pursued either through open or 
selective tendering. Open tendering allows all interested parties the opportunity 
to bid for the works. In the selective tendering process, contractors are subject to 
pre-qualification (Bagaka and Kobia 2010). Firms are short-listed on the basis of 
this pre-qualification and only a limited number are then invited to bid. Contractor 
selection involves the evaluation and selection of contractors leading to the award 
of construction contracts which is a crucial part of the road construction process 
(Arrows 2010).
According to Arrows (2010), repeatedly awarding contracts to a single contrac-
tor must be precluded; an impartial method must be used for selecting contractors 
who are to receive bid solicitations. Chetty and Eriksson (2002) posit that the se-
lection of a contractor for a project is a critical decision for the developer because 
they often rely on the contractor to manage the process of transforming a feasible 
concept into a functioning project. Although some owners have the expertise, 
resources and desire to lead the development effort on their own, choosing the 
right contractor can greatly improve the likelihood of project success. Contractor 
selection in this study refers to procurement methods and evaluation criteria.
Contractor monitoring is a management aspect that involves active tracking 
and control of the relationship between the supplier and the contracting authority. 
Contractor monitoring involves those activities performed by an employer/client 
after a contract has been awarded to determine the performance of the contractor 
in meeting the terms and conditions of the contract. It encompasses all dealings 
between the employer and the contractor from the time the contract is awarded 
until the work has been completed.
The dependent variable is the performance of road infrastructure projects. 
Clarke (2014) observed that performance is the accomplishment of a given task 
measured against predetermined known standards of accuracy, completeness, 
cost and speed. In a contract, performance is deemed to be the fulfilment of an 
obligation in a manner that releases the performer from all liabilities under the 
contract. Cheung et al. (2004) posited that performance is about how well some-
thing can be done. To measure project performance, a number of performance 
indicators such as time, cost and quality were considered. In support, Otim and 
Alinaitwe (2013) noted that, to establish the performance factors, project success 
has been widely considered by many scholars as an indicator of good perfor-
mance. Chan and Chan (2004) argue that project success can be categorised into 
the objective measures of time, cost, safety and environmental considerations 
and subjective measures of quality, functionality and satisfaction of project 
participants.
Langston (2012) posits that performance is not just about efficiency but about 
achieving desired results. He identified performance indicators to measure the 
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success of construction projects which include client satisfaction, stakeholder 
engagement, service delivery, investment return, urban renewal, defect minimisa-
tion, trust, dispute avoidance, innovation, safety and standard (Langston 2012). He 
noted, however, that the most commonly cited indicators are time of completion, 
project cost and workmanship (quality). For purposes of this study, performance 
of road infrastructure projects is measured in terms of time, cost and quality.
Contractor selection is conceptualised as the process of choosing the most 
appropriate contractor to deliver a specified project to ensure achievement of 
the best value for money. According to Ibadov (2015), the key stage for every 
construction project is its implementation and this stage is connected with the 
selection of a contractor. Contractor monitoring is conceptualised as the level of 
implementation of monitoring components as developed by Hinton (2003) name-
ly training, policies, plans, communication, payment, reports, records manage-
ment, inspections and audits, appraisal and dispute management. Performance 
measures are the basic input to a variety of decision processes and activities in 
infrastructure management. These include charting progress towards achieving 
operational, sectoral, and policy objectives; assessing whether users are receiv-
ing services that they want at the level of quality that they are willing to pay 
for; and comparing competing or alternative service providers to determine the 
most efficient provision arrangement for infrastructure service. A framework is 
presented for defining consistent measures of infrastructure performance, particu-
larly for roads and pavements. The framework identifies relevant indicators and 
the linkages between them. Because there are changes over time in information 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework
Source: (Adapted from Gitau 2013)
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needs and in the types of agencies using performance indicators as well as in 
their relationships to one another, a framework is needed to maintain consistency 
in the information bases used and to update the indicators to ensure relevance. 
Performance is measured at five major levels: (a) service quality and reliability 
from a user’s point of view; (b) cost; (c) operational efficiency and productivity 
from a service provider’s perspective; (d) time; (e) institutional performance in-
dicators such as effectiveness (Bshaka, Sabiti, Muhumza 2011). Which particular 
performance indicators are of interest depends very strongly on the view of the 
party involved in the use of the indicators (Barasa 2013).
THEORETICAL REVIEW
Many efforts have been made to develop the theoretical perspective for developing 
empirical understanding of the institutional theory. During recent years, this theory 
went through major advancements and gained popularity; however, we believe 
that it has several significant theoretical/methodological issues, which limit its ap-
plicability and effectiveness. The most important issues include static institutional 
explanations, and difficulty while calculating some institutional variables. In this 
study, we have addressed a major issue related to this theory in terms of its static 
nature, using the “institutionalisation” concept to explain institutional structures and 
to develop better institutional explanations. This study negates/refutes the claims of 
many researchers, who stated that the institutional theory is rich in concepts and 
has advanced to, “warrant more formal models and codification”. The theory draws 
attention to how organisations’ decision-making is influenced by the institutional, 
social and cultural factors as identified by Scott (2001), and in particular how ra-
tionalised activities are adopted by organisations. The theory emphasises the use of 
rules, laws and sanctions as enforcement mechanisms, with expedience as basis for 
compliance (Scott 2004). The theory explains good procedure as an effect of insti-
tutional decision-making (Scott 2004). The institutional theory helps in showing the 
relevance of structures, processes and systems and to establish whether contractor 
selection and monitoring has a significant effect on performance of road infrastruc-
ture projects. We suggest that identifying the determinants of changes in institutional 
structures, represents an important area for theoretical/empirical work.
Studies have already suggested that potential determinants of how specific struc-
tures are taken for granted and how strong incentives for maintaining the structure 
increase, instead of decreasing it. No major actors attempted to compel organisa-
tions to adopt a given structure, either through law or through withholding critical re-
sources. For organisational scholars, addressing the general issue of applicability re-
quires a consideration of how and when choices of action become socially defined; 
who acts to cause change and how to diffuse that change to other organisations.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The perspective of infrastructure provision, in the case of roads, includes indica-
tors relating to the characteristics of the road system and network such as the size, 
value, and distribution of the network; it also represents the performance of the 
facility in meeting demand for availability and access to road transportation users 
(Sodongi and Amran 2011:45).
Otim and Alinaitwe (2013) reiterated that to establish the performance factors, 
project success has been widely considered by many scholars as an indicator of 
good performance. Chan and Chan (2004) observed that project success can be 
categorised into the objective measures of time, cost, safety and environmental 
considerations and subjective measures of quality, functionality and satisfaction 
of project participants. However, Otim and Alinaitwe (2013) submit that in terms 
of enhancing effectiveness, road infrastructure projects in rural areas are on the 
lower scale compared to rural infrastructure projects in urban areas. Therefore, in 
bridging the gap, this may require the Uganda National Roads Autority (UNRA) 
to revise its policies in order to enhance sector innovativeness and performance.
Langston (2012) posited that performance is not just about efficiency but ef-
fectiveness. He identified performance indicators to measure the success of 
construction projects which include client satisfaction, stakeholder engagement, 
service delivery, investment return, urban renewal, defect minimisation, trust, dis-
pute avoidance, innovation, safety and standard. Okello (2016) argues that road 
construction projects are still associated with sub-standard work, loss of govern-
ment funds and untimely completion of projects. The most commonly cited indi-
cators are time of completion, project cost and workmanship (quality). Sebanatika 
(2013) further asserts that funds were set aside for monitoring and supervision in 
the budget for road projects but roads were found to be of poor quality compared 
to those works where there were no funds set aside. The funds were not neces-
sarily put to use, especially where works are undertaken by government. This 
study will close this gap by borrowing from the ideas of Okello (2016) who asserts 
that the most commonly cited indicators are time of completion, project cost and 
workmanship (quality).
Mulumba (2016) further explains that the choice of the right contractor strongly 
affects successful completion of construction works. This supports the earlier ar-
gument by Banaitien‐ and Banaitis (2006) that contractor selection is one of the 
main decisions made by the clients and in order to ensure that the project can be 
completed successfully, the client must select the most appropriate contractor. 
Indeed, it is critical for the client’s goals to manage the project schedule of cost, 
time and quality and general construction management (Puri and Tiwari 2014).
Puri and Tiwari (2014) further posit that selection of contractors is often con-
ducted during tendering which gives a client a choice in awarding a contract 
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to a company which proposes the lowest price and short construction cycles. 
In recent years, most entities make use of such a method. On the other hand, 
the research results show that the cheapest tenderers often have problems with 
completing the project (Okello 2016). Accepting the lowest price is the basic 
cause of the project completion problems because very often lowering the price 
means lowering the quality. These practices, however, are characterised by major 
weaknesses, because achieving lower costs does not necessarily give the best 
value. On the other hand, studies by Okello (2016) indicate that contractor selec-
tion is mainly by alternative procurement methods (APM) in which ownership 
(of decision-making) and responsibility for design and operation is passed to the 
contractor with the state adopting a regulatory role (Barasa 2013).
Muzaale and Auriacombe (2018) noted that the criteria determined for the 
evaluation of bids is a critical stage in the process of selecting a contractor from 
a number of bidding contractors that have submitted bids for a specified project 
(Nguyen 2015). Procurement and bid evaluation methods are critical steps in 
contractor selection, which involves the use of different procurement and evalua-
tion methods (Singh & Tiong 2005). Similarly, the institutional theory is applicable 
given the organisational set-up. The multicriteria theory in this context brings out 
the fact that different competencies and capabilities are considered during evalua-
tion of bids to arrive at an ideal contractor.
Hatush and Skitmore (1998) described a systematic multicriteria decision 
analysis as a contractor selection method based on utility. The study focused on 
what causes contractors to fail in project implementation but did not address what 
would lead to a weak contractor being selected. Sodangi and Amra (2011) investi-
gated a selected sample of 150 construction professionals operating in Malaysia to 
identify the actual criteria used by clients for the selection of contractors from the 
current practice in Malaysia. The results showed that track performance, financial 
capacity and technical capacity were the most important criteria and considered 
crucial for the selection of contractors in Malaysia. The study focused on the cri-
teria and not the entire process of contractor selection and possible challenges 
but it was silent on performance which was the problem subject to investigation 
in this study.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PERFORMANCE OF ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN UGANDA
The findings from interviews and documentary reviews, give the status of contrac-
tor selection and how it influences the performance of road transport projects. 
According to Mulumba (2016), the road construction industry is full of projects 
that were completed with significant time and cost overruns. According to Faridi 
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(2006) delays have an adverse impact on project success in terms of time, cost, 
quality and safety. The effects of road construction delays are not confined to the 
construction industry only, but influence the overall economy of a country. The 
study found that delay in payment of the contractor in completing works was ex-
perienced during the construction of Mukono-Katosi and Kisoga-Nyenga (74.2km 
and Kigumba-Masindi-Hoima-Kabwoya Roads. As Okello (2016) noted, contrac-
tual delay is a manifestation of failure by contractual parties involved to perform 
their obligations under the contract. Such obligations may include timely payment 
of workers for accomplished construction works as well as timely mobilisation of 
necessary equipment or machinery and manpower, among others.
Some road projects were characterised by overruns in cost; the issue of cost 
overruns is critical and needs to be addressed. Ssebanakita (2012) noted that 
cost overruns need to be identified and avoided so as to maximise benefits 
and returns from infrastructure construction projects. Costs arising due to such 
delays often manifest themselves in terms of accumulated interest on loans, high 
cost of maintaining management staff, as well as continuous escalation in wages 
and material prices.
Findings revealed that lack of access to finance, both during pre-construction 
which disqualifies emerging contractors from meeting guarantee and performance 
bond requirements; and during construction, which leads to cash flow problems; 
incomplete work and even liquidation are financial constraints facing emerging 
contractors. The payment predicament of the construction industry cannot be easily 
explained (Mulumba 2016). All parties including the owners, consultants, contrac-
tors, sub-contractors, suppliers and even public sector employers have an important 
role and must act in concert to take ownership of the problems and challenges.
Study findings revealed causes of cost overruns for contractors are: delay in 
certification, paymaster’s poor financial management, local culture, paymaster’s 
failure to implement good governance in business, underpayment of certified 
amounts by the paymaster, the use of payment for paid-when-paid clauses in con-
tracts, disagreement on the valuation of work done. Study findings revealed the 
paymaster’s wrongful withholding of payment, shortage of current year project 
budget, poor communication among parties involved, delay in submitting con-
tractor’s payment claim, conflict among parties involved, poor understanding of 
the contract. Furthermore, it was observed that there are cost overruns for the 
completed work due to bureaucracy in government departments. As Mulumba 
(2016) noted, payment to contractors or lack of it is a common cause of disputes 
in the construction industry.
Major road project works are delayed because sub-contractors are also af-
fected by cost overruns. Sub-contractors are often paid late by the main contrac-
tors because of pay-when-paid and pay-if-paid clauses included in most contract 
forms. The consequences of the sub-contractors being paid late are grave. In such 
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situations, some sub-contractors tend to increase their quotations, which in turn 
increases total project cost, an undesirable condition for owners. Amoako (2011) 
noted that it should be possible to improve sub-contractor payment practice if 
developers pay main contractors on time, and in turn main contractors pay their 
sub-contractors right after completion of sub-contract work.
Various parameters directly and indirectly contribute to the highway’s quality 
performance. The contributing factors are design, specifications, environment, 
and construction-related factors, while the indirect factors are managerial-related 
factors. Enshassi, Najjar, and Kumaraswamy (2017) noted that quality of construc-
tion projects is significantly affected by the characteristics of site layout, experi-
ence of site staff, consistency of design documents, the financial power of the 
contractor, and availability of construction materials.
The analysis of the results of the study showed that errors or omissions in 
construction work are found to be the highest ranking followed by inexperi-
enced or newly qualified consultants, political focus on reduced project costs, 
quality or time, unsettled or lack of project planning, and errors or inconsisten-
cies in project documents.
It was also found that gaps in road project performance could also have arisen 
due to a difference in expectations that leads to increase in construction costs 
and delays. Findings from the interviews further indicated that there was much 
political influence which compromised the quality of roads from identification 
of contractors, awarding of tenders, and the construction process. This not only 
increased the costs of road construction but also the quality was compromised on 
roads; for example, the Mpigi-Kinoni road. As Mulumba (2016) noted, political 
influence during selection negatively affects the performance of the road con-
struction projects in terms of quality and costs.
Contractor selection
Okello (2016) emphasised that a participatory approach will be the best for 
Uganda and this has been implemented through the contractor selection process 
that emphasises transparency. For many road projects, the existing contractor 
selection criteria are not appropriate for complex roads projects. The respond-
ents had mixed responses about the worthiness of the contractors selected for 
various road projects; however, the majority of the procurement professionals 
condemned the act by contractors who submit falsified documents, claiming to 
have adequate expertise and equipment at the preliminary stages. They noted that 
this in itself is affecting the performance of road projects in Uganda.
As to whether contractor selection procedures allow unnecessary interference 
through complaints which cause delays; an UNRA official noted that the “inter-
ference by oversight agencies delays the completion of the selection process, 
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this is common when bidders seek administrative review and PPDA as an over-
sight agency overturns the award”. He noted that in all cases where the Public 
Procurement and Disposal Authority (PPDA) has ordered a repeat of the process 
the cost outcome is always higher than the earlier submitted costs.
There are also many loopholes in the process of contractor selection. 
According to the PPDA Annual Performance Report (2016), the authority handled 
a total of 38 applications for administrative reviews, some of which were on major 
road projects. The administrative reviews handled were due to bidders’ dissatis-
faction with the evaluation process and quality of bidding documents, both of 
which affect the contractor selection process. The authority recommended re-
evaluating the bids to ensure fairness and transparency.
The selection procedure for many road projects had many unnecessary ap-
proval stages. As Mulumba (2016) noted, the contractor selection process in 
public procurement has various stages of approval manned by the various com-
mittees such as the evaluation committee, contracts committee, user department 
and the accounting officer. All these approval stages had a bearing on the length 
of the contract process of road projects. A UNRA Report (2016) reiterated that 
many of the procurement processes for various key roads infrastructure projects 
have taken longer than required to go through the procurement process.
A senior engineer of planning at UNRA when interviewed on the causes of 
delays in the selection process noted that the: “evaluation process takes too 
long because evaluators concentrate on technical issues which ideally would be 
handles at negotiation with the selected contractor”. He further observed that the 
way due diligence is handled at UNRA is ineffective and staff take too long on 
travels verifying projects even where the government has a mission that could 
handle these matters.
The analysis of contractor competency revealed that 64% of the respondents 
indicated that the selection criteria did not provide for methods to analyse contrac-
tor competency for some roads; for example, the Mukono-Katosi-Nyenga Road, 
while 11% disagreed and 25% remained undecided. This attribute of contractor 
selection had a mean score of 3.76. Furthermore, study findings revealed that the 
selection criteria do not require certified evidence from bidders to demonstrate 
their capacity to execute works. Failure by the evaluation teams to obtain certi-
fied evidence results in selection of incompetent contractors who end up taking 
longer than the contractual time.
Contractor monitoring, selection and 
performance of road projects
The study examined the relationship between contractor monitoring, contractor 
selection and performance of road projects and the results indeed reveal that the 
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relationship between contractor monitoring, selection and performance of road 
projects is positive and significant (beta=.480, p<0.01). This finding provides sup-
port for the argument that there is a significant relationship between contractor 
monitoring, selection and performance of road projects. This assertion is in line 
with previous studies which state that contractor monitoring and selection capa-
bility is related to the improvement of road performance.
Contractor monitoring, selection and oversight role of PPDA
The findings have revealed that there is a strong positive and significant relation-
ship between contractor monitoring, contractor selection and the oversight role 
of PPDA (beta=.765, p< 0.01) . This is in line with Okello (2016) who determined 
that changes in contractor monitoring are positively associated with changes in 
the oversight role of PPDA, implying that when UNRA improves on its contractor 
monitoring and selection this might lead to certain performance improvements on 
road projects.
Oversight role of PPDA and performance of road projects
The findings revealed that there is a strong positive and significant relation-
ship between the oversight role of PPDA and performance of road projects 
(beta=.428, p<0.01). The message here is that UNRA’s performance on road 
projects depends on the level of its commitment to the advice given by PPDA. 
This is in line with Okello (2016) who states that to attain and sustain perfor-
mance of road projects the status requires a good oversight role by the institu-
tions concerned.
Oversight role of PPDA mediates the relationship 
between contractor monitoring, selection 
and performance of road projects
The oversight role of PPDA appears to be a strong mediator in the relationship 
between contractor selection, monitoring and performance of road projects. 
Through the oversight role, contractor monitoring and selection influences per-
formance of road projects in Uganda. This is in line with Basheka, Sabiti and 
Muhumuza (2011) who contend that performance is built through the oversight 
role of the concerned institutions. Hence, the oversight role of PPDA is critical 
in building adaptive capacity which is significant in enhancing performance. 
The findings of this study have demonstrated similar phenomena as observed by 
Luthia (2009), except that in this case the findings revealed (unlike in the study 
by Luthia (2009) that established full mediation of organisational performance 
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on the relationship between contractor monitoring and performance), that 
contractor selection and monitoring do not have a direct influence on the per-
formance of road projects except through the oversight role of PPDA. Hence, 
the oversight role of PPDA is a powerful mediator in the relationship between 
contractor selection, monitoring and performance of road infrastructure proj-
ects in Uganda.
Discussion of findings
Contractor selection appears to be a strong mediator in relationships between 
contractor monitoring and the performance of road projects in Uganda. This 
is in line with studies such as Byaruhanga and Muzaale (2018) who contend 
that performance of road projects is through good contractor selection. It can 
therefore be argued that good contractor selection is critical in building a good 
road network system performance in Uganda. Contractor selection is based on 
procedure; for example, the firms that are eventually awarded contracts by the 
contracts committee should be in line with the evaluation committee recommen-
dations. Section 29 (C) of the PPDA Act of 2003 mandates the powers to award 
contracts in accordance with applicable procurement or disposal procedures to 
the Contracts Committee. Selecting a contractor is one of the major decisions 
which influences the progress and success of any construction project (Banaitien‐ 
and Banaitis 2006).
Mulumba (2016) noted political influence negatively affects the performance 
of the road construction projects in terms of quality and costs. On appropri-
ateness of selection criteria, contractor selection criteria were not appropriate 
for complex roads projects. Contractor selection procedures allowed unneces-
sary interference through complaints which caused delays on some roads. On 
analysis of contractor competency, the selection criterion does not provide for 
methods to analyse contractor competency. The selection criterion does not 
require certified evidence from bidders to demonstrate their capacity to execute 
works. Contract selection has become a priority for public entities like UNRA. 
In a developing country like Uganda, having an effective contractor selection 
system is still a major challenge to many public entities (Oluka 2013). Contractor 
selection is one area that needs careful attention from all stakeholders in public 
entities because it has a huge influence on service delivery, and this is one way 
of accounting to the tax payers (Barasa 2013). Okello (2016) contends that the 
PPDA must play a central role in providing training, technical guidance and en-
suring compliance to all set rules. Sabiti, Basheka and Muhumuza (2011) noted 
that proper contractor selection influences procurement performance. Some 
contractors selected lack the appropriate experience and this is clearly seen 
from the works accomplished. Some roads have been a particular nightmare 
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for motorists considering that some contractors selected reluctantly execute the 
tasks, ending up doing shoddy work.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The implications for the existing theory can be formulated in two ways (1) wheth-
er or not the findings support the views of the existing theory (i.e. support or 
contradict), and (2) whether or not the findings have filled the theoretical gaps 
to contribute or not contribute. The study has contributed to the conceptualisa-
tion of performance and provides evidence that performance can be described 
as measurement of what UNRA has achieved in terms of contractor monitoring 
and selection. Performance is the outcome of a clear vision, aligned objectives 
and focused and sustained efforts. A performance management process should 
tie together and reinforce these elements. The components of performance can 
be taken to be an outcome of many attributes of performance which were hard 
to pin down in the extant literature (see Okello 2016; Barasa 2013; Oluka 2012; 
Basheka 2013; Basheka, Sabiti, Muhumuza 2011).
It is recommended that UNRA should place more emphasis on continuous 
improvement of the selection processes since it significantly influences road proj-
ects’ performance. UNRA should also address causes of delays in contractor se-
lection by adopting innovative methods such as Fit-for-Purpose and Competitive 
Dialogue techniques to ensure value for money. The PPDA as a regulator, should 
focus on a proactive approach in supporting the road agency in making the con-
tractor selection process more efficient.
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